Bondi terror royal commission hands down 14 recommendations

ASIO warned repeatedly about the increased risk of a terrorist attack and the rise of anti-Semitism in the year before the Bondi Beach shooting, but governments didn’t change anything about the counter-terrorism system event after the threat level was formally increased, the Bell royal commission has found.

It also found the level of resources specifically for counter-terrorism in national security agencies fell over the past five years, despite their overall budgets increasing.

Commissioner Virginia Bell has made 14 recommendations in an interim report released on Thursday that deals with intelligence and security efforts around the deadly shooting on December 14 where 15 people were killed.

The royal commission will begin its first hearings on Monday where broader questions about the rise in anti-Semitism and fracturing of social cohesion in Australia will be examined.

Ms Bell’s interim report says there has been a “sharp rise” in anti-Semitic incidents in Australia since Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, and that the US-Israel-Iran war “is likely to have increased the risk of attacks directed at the Australian Jewish community”.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said his government accepted all the recommendations that were matters for the Commonwealth, and would work with the States and Territories to implement the others.

“Five months on from the attack, Australia’s Jewish community is still grieving, still hurting, still craving answers,” he said.

NSW Premier Chris Minns described the report as “sobering reading” and said the State Government had failed in its “highest responsibility”, to protect people.

“We take responsibility for that today and, as I said, do everything we can to change and ensure we confront evil and terrorism wherever it is in NSW,” he said.

Five of the interim report’s recommendations are classified and won’t be made public.

They relate to key questions around travel alerts, sharing classified information between different agencies, and access to national firearms data.

Chapters dealing with the timeline of the emergency response on the day of the Bondi attack, Commonwealth and State law enforcement and intelligence agency activities in relation to the attack, information-sharing between these agencies, and counter-terrorism priorities and resourcing are also largely withheld from the public report.

“Our inquiry revealed some respects in which counter-terrorism capability at Commonwealth and state levels might be improved,” Ms Bell said.

Alex Ryvchin, chief executive of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, said there were still a lot of unanswered questions around how the alleged shooters Naveed and Sajid Akram escaped the attention of authorities, but that this was an important step.

“We need to get to a point where Jewish Australians at Hanukkah this year, at the end of the year, feel safe, that we can gather again, that we won’t be targeted. It’s going to be a long process to get us to that point,” he said.

But the report found no intelligence or law enforcement agencies could point to law changes that would have helped them prevent the Bondi Beach shooting.

And it explicitly says it doesn’t suggest that the Bondi attack might have been averted if the recommended changes were in place.

Shadow Home Affairs minister Jonno Duniam said there was a difference between “not hindering” and “helping”.

“Bondi still happened. 15 people still died. And of course there are improvements in the recommendations outlined by Commissioner Bell that need to be taken seriously,” he said.

ASIO director general Mike Burgess made repeated warnings about the risk of a terrorist attack, starting from 2023 and ramping up after the terrorism alert level was raised to probable in August 2024.

“ASIO publicly and repeatedly drew attention to the heightened risk of a terrorist attack and to an environment of ‘disturbing escalation’ of antisemitic incidents,” the report says.

This included a Holiday 2025-26 threat assessment issued in early December that specifically warned ASIO’s “greatest concern is the threat from lone actors or small cells on the edge of established groups” and of the possibility of attacks on crowded events.

“The open-ended question then is whether those warnings were taken seriously enough and acted upon before the terrorist attack,” says ASPI executive director Justin Bassi.

“Whether the answer is yes or no, there needs to be increased transparency with the public on the nature of the threats we face and a focus on increased security which helps lead to strengthened social cohesion.”

He said the report didn’t appear to back claims there had been an intelligence failure, although that issue was likely to be explored further in hearings.

While the overall funding to Commonwealth security agencies grew between 2020 and 2025, the proportion allocated to counter-terrorism “significantly declined”, the commission found.

For NSW Police, its total budget doubled in dollar terms over the past 15 years but the proportion allocated to counter-terrorism stayed about the same.

And the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator has been a part-time position since 2019, held by a senior Home Affairs official who also does other jobs.

One recommendation is to make this role full-time.

There are also questions about the effectiveness of the AFP-NSW Police-ASIO joint counter-terrorism team and whether information is properly shared between the two police forces.

This underpins a call for a three-month review of the JCT teams reporting to all police commissioners and the ASIO boss.

Mr Albanese was pressed by reporters on the rise of anti-Semitism and whether the recommendation that NSW Police should provide more protection for Jewish festivals and events was an admission that not enough has been done.

He repeated his sentiment since January, that governments could always do better.

“Social cohesion is important. Governments don’t control, by themselves, social cohesion — that’s something that everyone in the community has a role in,” he said.

“We will continue to work each and every day to promote social cohesion and to stamp out anti-Semitism.”

The government has already appointed Jillian Segal as the special envoy on anti-Semitism, created a new national student ombudsman, increased security funding, and set up the royal commission, he said.

Other recommendations say counter-terrorism procedures should be updated more regularly, that the Australia New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee should brief national cabinet at least once a year on counter-terrorism challenges and priorities, and that the prime minister, premiers and national security committee ministers should participate in regular counter-terrorism exercises.

It says that, while the NSC meets regularly, its “match fitness” for a major terrorist attack would improve with regular practice scenarios so the first time they’re calling the shots isn’t during a serious incident.

The interim report also recommends that NSW Police should extend its security arrangements and threat assessments for Jewish high holy days to all high-risk Jewish festivals and events, especially those in public.

Ms Bell says Governments should prioritise efforts for a gun buyback in all States and speed up work on tougher, national firearms laws.

Queensland, South Australia and the NT have so far refused to sign up to a national gun buyback scheme and stronger laws, while Tasmania is only partially on board.

The examination of agencies was originally commissioned as a standalone piece of work from former top security bureaucrat Dennis Richardson, but was rolled into the royal commission when it was established.

Mr Richardson quit in mid-March, saying he didn’t find his full expertise was necessary to the new format of the work.

The royal commission begins its first hearings on Monday, for a block of two weeks. It will deliver a final report before the anniversary of the shooting on December 14.

Recommendations from the Bondi royal commission

1. The procedures adopted by NSW Police in respect of Operation Jewish High Holy Days should apply to other high risk Jewish festivals and events, particularly those that have a public facing element.
2. Having regard to the significance of the role of the Commonwealth Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in providing counter-terrorism leadership, the Commission recommends consideration be given to making the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator’s role full-time.
3. If the ANZCTC is to be used again as a crisis committee, the ANZCTC should be included in the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework so its role is clear.
4. The Counter-Terrorism Handbook should be updated promptly and then at least every three years in coordination with updates to the Counter-Terrorism Plan and the ANZCTC triennial review.
5. The ANZCTC should provide direct advice in the form of a written and/or oral briefing, at least annually, to National Cabinet (including, as appropriate, advice on ANZCTC activities, the use of the ANZCTC Special Fund, and national counter-terrorism challenges and priorities).
6. The ANZCTC should commission a review of the Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams, with a report to be submitted to Police Commissioners and the Director-General of Security within three months of commencement. The review should include consideration of leadership structures, team integration, systems access and information sharing arrangements. The review should place particular focus on the Joint Counter-Terrorism Team-NSW, elements of which should be for reporting specifically to the NSW Police Commissioner, the AFP Commissioner and the Director-General of Security.
7. The Australian Government should consider whether National Security Committee ministers, including the Prime Minister, should participate in a counter-terrorism exercise, along with all National Cabinet members, within nine months of each federal election.
8. CLASSIFIED — relates to access of agencies to Australian Firearms Information Network data
9. CLASSIFIED — relates to travel alert systems and the Integrated Cargo System administered by Home Affairs
10. CLASSIFIED — relates to travel alert systems and the Integrated Cargo System administered by Home Affairs
11. CLASSIFIED — relates to sharing information between people with different levels of security clearances
12. CLASSIFIED — relates to sharing information between people with different levels of security clearances
13. The Commonwealth and states and territories should prioritise efforts to finalise and implement an updated and nationally consistent National Firearms Agreement.
14. The Commonwealth, states and territories should prioritise efforts to implement the proposed National Gun Buyback Scheme.